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Abstract
We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker
faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on
its preferences and the extent and eectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that
a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may nd it optimal to
set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit
more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploy-
ing inadequate resources on cost{eective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating
a larger budget on less eective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one in-
strument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant ow: if the supply is large,
border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number
of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re{election concerns might provide a
rationale for the widespread use of less a eective enforcement tool, such as border control.
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1 Introduction
Illegal immigration is widespread because, although tight migration quotas tend to be the norm,
governments in practice fail to enforce them. One simple explanation is that destination countries
are unable to implement policies because of the limited tools at their disposal. At the same
time, Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) and Fasani (2009) { amongst others { have argued that the
pressure applied by those sectors that intensively use illegal immigrants might be responsible for
the lax policy enforcement. In other words, the observed large number of illegal immigrants might
be the result of both a lack of instruments, and an intentional government policy, which responds
to the needs of specic economic interests.1
In particular, underfunding of enforcement agencies has been a chronic issue in the United
States, the United Kingdom and other countries.2 Moreover, the limited resources available are
often allocated to policy tools, like border enforcement, that are not particularly eective in
achieving the objective of reducing illegal immigration, rather than to more eective instruments
like worksite inspections. In fact, as pointed out by United States General Accounting Oce
(2005), \worksite enforcement was a low priority for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and continues to be a low priority for Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE)..." Table
1 corroborates this view. Between 1999 and 2003, the average number of ocers' hours devoted
to line-watch border patrol was thirty times as large as the number of ocers' hours devoted to
worksite inspections. At the same time, border apprehensions were only ten times larger than
interior apprehensions, suggesting that in terms of ocers' hours, each border apprehension is
three times more costly than an interior one.
The migration policy enforcement priorities pursued by U.S. agencies have led several observers
to conclude that the ineective use of resources is driven by political constraints (Cornelius et al.
2004, Hanson 2006, Massey et al. 2002) and importantly, the experience of the United States
is shared by many other countries. For example, Italy has recently implemented tighter border
controls, even if this is unlikely to have the desired eects.3
What drives the slack in migration policy enforcement? Which factors explain the use of
ineective enforcement tools, such as border control? We answer these questions proposing a
1For an analysis of the role of lobbies in shaping ocial immigration policy in the United States, see Facchini,
Mayda, and Mishra (2011).
2Even the recent immigration reform proposal, i.e. the \Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigra-
tion Modernization Act", (S.744, 2013), contained a provision to increase by 40 billions the budget devolved to
border enforcement over the next decade, including adding 20000 Border Patrol agents and 700 miles of fencing
along the Southern border (New York Times, \Senate, 68 to 32 Passes Overhaul for Immigration", June 27, 2013).
This clearly suggests that underfunding continues to be perceived as a serious issue in the United States. In the UK,
a recent report by the House of Commons Home Aairs Committee has pointed out that the resources available to
the enforcement agency are also grossly inadequate. See House of Commons, Home Aairs Committee (2011).
3As argued by Triandafyllidou (2009) \Although Italy is sadly famous for the images of clandestine immigrants
landing on the shores of its Southern coasts, ocial records show that migrants arrived via boats represent only a
small fraction (4%-16% in the period 2000-2006) of the existing stock of undocumented residents."
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reputation building model based on Facchini and Testa (2014), where voters and the policy maker
may have divergent preferences over immigration, and the latter can use dierent tools to control
migration ows, namely domestic and border enforcement. The migration policy is the outcome of
a simple two{period political agency model. During each term in oce an incumbent politician sets
a migration policy that involves an ocial migration target, determining the number of migrants
to be admitted legally, and the extent of enforcement to be carried out either domestically or at the
border. The latter is assumed to be less eective, as it requires the expense of more resources to
achieve the same migration target. When enforcement fails to deliver the chosen migration target,
illegal immigration emerges. As in Facchini and Testa (2014), voters are heterogeneous in their
factor endowments, and richer individuals prefer more foreign workers. Thus, under standard
income distributions (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Dutt and Mitra 2002), the median prefers less
migrants than the average voter. As typical in political agency models, we assume uncertainty
on the state of the world { in our case the supply of migrants that can be either large or small
{ and asymmetric information about the politician's preferences. Namely, the public does not
know whether the incumbent is populist (i.e. his preferences are perfectly aligned with those of
the median voter), or utilitarian (i.e. he shares the preferences of the average citizen).4
In this environment, voters use outcome measures of performance { i.e. the total number of
migrants in the country { to gauge the incumbent's type. Since incumbents desire reelection,
because of the inuence they wield in determining policy, then electoral incentives will aect
policy choices. When only one enforcement tool is available, Facchini and Testa (2014) show that
a simple \reputation-building" equilibrium can arise where a utilitarian incumbent overrides his
personal preferences to gain the support of the median voter. To that end, he sets a migration
target that responds to the median voter's interests, but underinvests in its enforcement to de
facto admit more foreign workers as illegals.
How do multiple tools aect the incentives faced by the government? In particular, why should
the incumbent choose to invest in border control, even if the other tool is more cost eective? To
answer this question we allow the incumbent government to strategically choose not only the
budget allocated to enforcement activities, but also how resources are channeled toward each tool.
Analyzing the choice between the two enforcement technologies, we show under what condition
a reputation building equilibrium can emerge, where the incumbent nds it is desirable to set
a target pleasing the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement by using a less cost{eective
instrument like border enforcement. Our results indicate that the size of the supply of migrants,
which is not observed either by the politician or the public, is key to determine the desirability of
one instrument over the other. In particular, if the supply of foreign workers is small, domestic
enforcement is favored because it delivers the same migration target while employing less resources.
4The presence of a utilitarian politician in the model captures the public opinion gap in immigration policy that
has been identied by Chiswick and Hatton (2003).
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On the other hand, if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although
more costly, it might bring the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum, thus reducing
the policy distortion driven by strategic motives. As a result, if the expected gain in the large
supply scenario is big enough, border enforcement will be chosen. The analysis of two enforcement
technologies also delivers another important result: when the government can choose not only the
enforcement budget but also how to use it, illegal immigration driven by strategic motives arises
more often because, by channeling resources toward border enforcement, the incumbent is able
to sustain a reputation building equilibrium that could not occur with one instrument alone.
Consequently, even if border enforcement may reduce the policy distortion induced by strategic
behavior, its very availability implies that strategic lax enforcement can be more easily carried
out.
Our analysis builds on the literature that has investigated the political economy forces that
shape immigration policy making (e.g. Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005, Facchini and Willmann 2005
and Facchini and Testa 2014). It is also related to the body of works that have considered the
eectiveness of dierent migration policy instruments from the point of view of the maximization
of the destination country's aggregate welfare (e.g. Ethier 1986, Bond and Chen 1987 and Chau
2001). In particular, it provides a positive analysis that can rationalize why elected politicians
choose what many scholars have identied as an ineective instrument to limit the inow of
undocumented foreigners. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the framework used in the analysis, while section 3 studies the political desirability of border and
domestic enforcement. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of illegal immigration
To study the migration policy formation process we lay out a reputation building model based
on Facchini and Testa (2014), where the preferences of voters and policy-maker over the optimal
number of migrants may diverge, opening the possibility that the incumbent distorts his policy
choices to gain re-election. In particular, we consider a small open economy (Home) producing
a single good using labor E according to a production function Y = F (E), with F 0(E) > 0,
F 00(E) < 0. F (E) is such that there exists a well-dened prot function associated to it, and the
corresponding monetary payment can be interpreted as the compensation received by an immobile
factor.5 As for prices, let aggregate output be the numeraire, the real wage in Home be denoted
by w, and the prot function be given by (w).
The economy is populated by a continuum of native individuals indexed by i 2 [0; 1], whose
mass is normalized to one. Every individual i supplies one unit of labor, and receives a fraction
5A natural candidate would be land, or alternatively capital.
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i > 0 of the prots, with
R
idi = 1.
6 Furthermore, we assume the domestic wage under autarky
to be larger than the wage prevailing in the rest of the world. Thus, abstracting from moving
costs, foreign workers will always nd it desirable to relocate to Home. To capture the uncertainty
in immigration pressure, the supply I^ of migrants is assumed to be stochastic, and depending on
the state of the world s, which can be either high (H) or low (L) with probabilities q and 1   q
respectively. In particular, let I^(L) = I < I = I^(H).
Admitting immigrants I leads to welfare gains for Home, which are bounded by the presence
of a \congestion" cost c(I), which is a dierentiable, increasing and convex function. Limiting the
migrant's inow involves a policy enforcement cost [I^(s); I] that depends on the supply of foreign
workers I^(s) and the target I chosen by the government.
The utility of a native individual i, for a given state of the world s, can therefore be written as
ui[I; bI(s)] = i[w(1 + I)] + w(1 + I)  c(I)  [bI(s); I] (1)
where 1 + I represents total employment of natives and migrants in the country.7 The rst term
on the right hand side captures the individual's share of prots, the second his wage income,
whereas the third and fourth terms denote the congestion and the policy enforcement costs, that
are equally shared among all citizens. Assuming that the enforcement cost is a linear decreasing
function of the migration target and that for any target a larger supply I^ of migrants has a
positive eect on both the total and the marginal cost of enforcement (i.e. (I; I) > (I; I), and
j @
@I
(I; I) j>j @
@I
(I; I) j for all I),8 Lemma 1 in Facchini and Testa (2014) shows that, as long as
the congestion cost is suciently convex, the number of migrants maximizing individual utility
under the state of the world s is an increasing function of i. Moreover, for a given i the optimal
number of migrants preferred by individual i in the high state of the world (Ii (H)) is larger than
the number preferred in the low state of the world (Ii (L)).
Knowing the probability of each state of the world, i's expected utility can be written as
E[ui(I)] = qui(I; I) + (1  q)ui(I; I) (2)
Given that ui(I) is linear in its stochastic component,
9 the migration target Ii maximizing
6We assume the distribution of factor ownership to be atomless i.e., that every agent only owns a tiny fraction
of the total supply of the xed factor. Notice that if we denote with Ki agent's i supply of the xed factor,R
I
Kidi = K. Since population size is normalized to 1, K is also the average supply of the xed factor in the
population. Dene i =
Ki
K > 0. Then E(i) =
R
I
idi = 1. In other words, i can be interpreted as the holding
of the xed factor by agent i relative to the population average.
7In other words, native and immigrant labor are perfect substitutes in production. This assumption simplies the
analysis of model, and allowing for imperfect substitutability, while complicating the algebra, would not signicantly
aect our conclusions.
8An example of such an enforcement cost function is given by s = as[I^(s) I], where s 2 fL;Hg, with aH > aL.
9This implies that the policy maker is risk neutral.
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Figure 1: Illegal immigration
expected utility is given by:
Ii = (1  q)Ii (L) + qIi (H) (3)
where Ii (H) and I

i (L) are respectively the optimal number of migrants under the high and low
state of the world. Moreover, since  is linear in I, the corresponding expected policy enforcement
cost is given by:
(Ii ) 2 ([I; Ii (L)]; [I; Ii (H)]) (4)
Note that since the enforcement budget is chosen under imperfect information on the state of
the world, the migration target cannot be exactly met. In particular, ex{post, given the realized
supply of foreign workers, the actual number of migrants, denoted by Ii(s), diers from the state
contingent optimal target Ii (s). This point is intuitively explained using gure 1, where we
represent the enforcement cost functions under the two possible states of the world. If the state
of the world is high, to obtain the optimal immigration level Ii (H), individual i should spend
[I; Ii (H)]. Hence, having spent only
(Ii ) < [I; I

i (H)] (5)
the actual number of migrants is Ii(H) > I

i . At the same time, given the information constraint,
Ii maximizes his expected utility. The dierence Ii(H)   Ii represents the number of illegal
immigrants. On the other hand, if the state of the world is low, the individual over-invests in
enforcement, and the number Ii(L) of immigrants actually entering the country is lower than the
target, Ii . Moreover, Facchini and Testa (2014) show that illegal immigration is larger, the more
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restrictive is the migration target Ii . If the migration policy is chosen by majority voting, then
it will reect the preferences of the median voter, and will in general dier from those of the
average voter (which coincide in this set-up with aggregate welfare). In particular, since under
typical wealth distributions the median is poorer than the average (Alesina and Rodrik 1994), the
median voter will prefer a smaller number of migrants than the average voter. As a result, illegal
immigration is higher if the policy preferred by the median instead of the average voter is chosen.
Within this economic environment, Facchini and Testa (2014) study how the divergence of
preferences between the incumbent government and the median voter can distort migration policy.
To this end, they consider a model of elections with two periods, and where in each period the
politician in oce chooses a migration policy. Between periods there is an election in which voters
decide whether to re{elect or not the incumbent, and the median voter plays a decisive role.
Politicians may be one of two types g 2 fp; bg. The rst type is a \populist" (p) and has preferences
perfectly aligned with the median voter; the second type is \utilitarian" (or Bethamite, b), and has
preferences aligned with the average voter. A politician g maximizes his expected intertemporal
utility given by Ug(I) = E[ug;1(I; I^(s))] + ug;2 where ug;t, t = 1; 2 are the per period payos
dened in equation 1,  is the probability of re-election, and the future is not discounted.
The types of the rst period incumbent and challenger are draws from an identical distribution,
and the probabilities that the politician is populist or utilitarian are denoted by  and 1   
respectively. The type of the politician is only known to himself, whereas the distribution of types
is common knowledge. In the rst period, the supply of foreign workers bI(s) is not observed either
by the politician or the public, but they both know its distribution. Thus, in the rst period
the incumbent chooses a migration policy prescribing a target and the amount of resources to
be spent on enforcement, under imperfect information on the actual supply of foreign workers.
Voters, having observed the target and the actual number of migrants, but neither their true supply
nor the amount of resources spent on enforcement, revise their beliefs on the incumbent's type
according to Bayes rule, and choose whether to re{elect or replace him with a challenger. In the
second period, the state of the world is revealed, the elected politician chooses again the number
of immigrants to be admitted and the world ends. Uncertainty on potential migration ows, and
the government's superior information over important aspects of policy design, make it dicult
for the voter to punish or reward the incumbent. We consider two possible sources of information
asymmetry. First, the public might not be informed on the budgetary aspects of migration policy,
and this may allow the politician to exploit his information advantage to strategically under{invest.
Second, voters may not be aware of the characteristics of the enforcement technologies available to
the policymaker, and thus they can fall victim of a strategic misallocation of the resources towards
a less eective policy instrument. Of course, in the real world the public might be able to obtain
some information on the budget or the enforcement technology adopted, but this information is
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unlikely to be perfect.10 To capture this idea and to keep our analysis tractable, we thus assume
that enforcement is not observable.
2.1 Equilibrium
The above structure denes a game of incomplete information between voters and politicians that
can be solved by backward induction. In this section we characterize the equilibrium policy choice
assuming that only one tool (domestic enforcement) is available, and we will subsequently general-
ize our analysis allowing the policy-maker to choose between border and domestic enforcement. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the above described game consists of a migration policy, a voting
rule and set of beliefs such that (a) voters' beliefs are generated by Bayesian updating, (b) the vot-
ing rule is optimal given the voters' beliefs and the politicians' strategies and (c) the incumbent's
strategy is optimal given the voters' beliefs and the opponent's and voters' strategies.
In the second period, because there are no further elections, the incumbent chooses the policy
maximizing his own utility, and since he can observe the supply of foreign workers, he chooses the
optimal amount of enforcement (i.e. there is no illegal immigration). In the rst period, the policy
choice is more complex because of re-election concerns, and it crucially depends on voters' beliefs.
Let P [g = pjIg; I(s)] be the ex-post probability that the incumbent (g) is a populist (p) when
the observed number of migrants is I(s) and the target is Ig. Focussing on monotonic beliefs,
11
a populist incumbent will always choose the policy preferred by the median voter because, by
doing otherwise, he cannot strengthen his reputation of being a populist, and hence increase his
chances of re-election. The same logic does not apply to the utilitarian type though. In the rst
period, if he chooses the migration policy preferred by the average voter (sincere strategy), he
can only decrease his ex-post probability of being considered a populist, whereas by \pooling"
with a populist, he may raise it. Given the assumption of monotonic beliefs, in order to \pool",
10In fact, even researchers have hardly been able to collect detailed systematic data on spending on enforcement.
To understand the nature of the problem, consider for example the case of the United States. In this context
two agencies are responsible for the enforcement of migration policy (U.S. Customs and Border Protection and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)), but they also carry out a series of other duties - ranging
from the prevention of smuggling of contraband, to the prosecution and deportation of non{citizens who have
been convicted of a felony in the US etc. The publicly available data refer only to aggregate budgets, which
make it impossible to precisely measure the resources allocated to each particular activity especially given that
these agencies have substantial exibility in the allocation of their resources. In particular United States General
Accounting Oce (2005) points out that \... After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused their resources on
national security-related investigations. According to ICE, the redirection of resources from other enforcement
programs to perform national security-related investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional program
areas, like worksite enforcement and fraud."
11Monotonic beliefs imply that whenever the median voter observes a migration target and a number of migrants
coinciding with his most preferred one, he does not revise downward the probability that the incumbent has his
same preferences, and viceversa. This assumption, as in Coate and Morris (1995), insures that the politician with
preferences aligned with the voter will not have incentives to distort his policy. An alternative assumption leading
to the same equilibrium outcome would be that the populist does not behave strategically. See Besley and Smart
(2007).
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the utilitarian politician must (i) set the median voter's most preferred target Ip ; and (ii) choose
a level of enforcement that allows him to replicate the same number of migrants admitted by a
populist at least under some state of the world. This is possible using three strategies. First,
the amount spent on enforcement coincides with (Ip ), so that the number of migrants admitted
always equals the one chosen by a populist. We label this strategy \mimicking". Second, the
enforcement expenditure could be set at a level u < (I

p ) such that, if the state of the world is
low, the migration level Iub (L) equals that generated by a populist type under the high state of
the world, i.e. Iub (L) = Ip(H). On the other hand, if the state of the world is high, the number of
foreign workers entering the country will be higher than the upper-bound obtained by the populist,
i.e. Iub (H) > Ip(H). We label this strategy \under{investment". Third, enforcement could be set
at a level o > (I

p ) allowing to \pool" with the populist only if the state of the world is high,
whereas if it is low, the number of migrants will be smaller than the lower-bound obtained by the
populist i.e. Iob (L) < Ip(L). Note that in the last scenario illegal immigration will never arise, and
for this reason we focus on the rst two strategies, i.e. those relevant for the analysis of illegal
immigration.
As argued by Facchini and Testa (2014), the process of updating voters' beliefs can be described
as follows. Since a populist politician always chooses the migration target and the enforcement
level preferred by the median voter, whenever the median voter observes a target dierent from
Ip or a level of migration dierent from either Ip(H) or Ip(L), he concludes that the incumbent is
utilitarian. On the other hand, denoting by s the probability that a utilitarian incumbent admits
a total number Ip(H) of migrants when the state of the world is s 2 fH;Lg, then if voters observe
the target Ip and the outcome Ip(H), the ex-post probability that the incumbent is a populist can
be computed as follows:
P [g = pjIp ; Ip(H)] =
q
q + q(1  )H + (1  q)(1  )L
where q is the probability that Ip(H) is generated by a populist, q(1 )H is the probability that
it is generated by a utilitarian type mimicking the populist, and (1  q)(1 )L is the probability
that it is generated by a utilitarian type under-investing in enforcement. In the remainder of our
analysis, to save on notation, we will drop the target Ip from the denition of the conditional
probabilities, as it is the same under all strategies we consider.
If mimicking is chosen, then H = 1 and L = 0, which implies that P [g = pjIp(H)] = , i.e.
the ex-ante and ex-post probabilities of the incumbent being populist are the same. On the other
hand, if under{investment is chosen , then H = 0 and L = 1, and:
P [g = pjIp(H)] = q
q + (1  q)(1  )
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Note that q
q+(1 q)(1 ) >  if and only if q >
1
2
. In other words, under{investment can generate
an upward revision of the ex-ante probability that the incumbent is a populist only if \pooling"
is suciently costly for the utilitarian incumbent (i.e. q is suciently large). This is because the
larger is q, the higher is the probability that by under-investing he will end up revealing his type.
Given this structure of beliefs, a sequentially rational voting rule for the median voter is to
retain the incumbent if and only if he believes that the ex-post probability that the incumbent is a
populist is strictly larger than the ex-ante probability, i.e. P [g = pjI(s)] > .12 Based on the voting
strategy described above, mimicking is never optimal because in this case P [g = pjIp(H)] = .
For the same reason, if q  1=2, under-investment cannot be optimal. On the other hand, if
q > 1
2
, under-investment might be optimal because if the state of the world turns out to be
low, the incumbent is re-elected, and in the second period he will be able to choose his most
preferred number of migrants Ib (L).If the state of the world is instead high, he will be replaced
by a challenger who is populist with probability  and utilitarian with probability 1  . We are
now ready to write the expected payo of the utilitarian politician and to simplify notation we
will drop the index i = b. If the under{investment strategy is chosen, the payo is given by:
U(under) = (1  q)u[Ip(H)] + qu[Iub (H)] + (1  q)u[Ib (L)] + qfu[Ip (H)] + (1  )u[Ib (H)]g
where the rst two terms capture the utility of the utilitarian politician in the rst period when
he spends u on enforcement, and the state of the world is low (with probability (1  q)) and high
(with probability q). The remaining two terms represent instead his second period payo which
depends on whether he is re{elected and on the state of the world. Similarly, if the utilitarian
plays sincere, his payo can be written as:
U(sincere) = (1  q)u[Ib(L)] + qu[Ib(H)] +
+ fqu[Ip (H)] + (1  q)u[Ip (L)]g+ (1  )fqu[Ib (H)] + (1  q)u[Ib (L)]g
Some additional notation is useful to characterize the case where U(under) > U(sincere). Let
1HU(under) = u[I
u
b (H)]   u[Ib(H)] be the rst period utility dierence from choosing under{
investment rather than the sincere strategy if the state of the world is high. Similarly, let
1LU(under) = u[Ip(H)]   u[Ib(L)] be the rst period utility dierence when the state of the
world is low. Finally, let 2U(under) = u[Ib (L)]   u[Ip (L)] > 0 be the second period utility
12If P [g = pjI] > , then for the median voter it is not optimal to replace the incumbent with a challenger that has
a lower probability of being populist, and the opposite is true if P [g = pjI] < . Finally, if P [g = pjI] = , dismissing
the incumbent is optimal because it induces revelation of types. To see this, rst note that when P [g = pjI] = ,
dismissing the incumbent is a credible punishment because the median voter is indierent between keeping him
and replacing him with somebody with the same probability of being a populist. Second, since mimicking does not
increase re-election chances, the utilitarian politician prefers choosing the social surplus maximizing policy, thus
revealing his type.
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gain from being in power, when the state of the world is low as compared to being replaced by a
populist challenger. Under{investment is preferred if the following holds:
 [q1HU(under) + (1  q)1LU(under)] < (1  q)2U(under) (6)
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the rst period expected utility loss from under{
investment: since the maximization of the one period expected utility requires an enforcement
level (Ib ) > u, by underinvesting the utilitarian incumbent incurs a utility loss given by
[q1HU(under) + (1   q)1LU(under)] < 0. The right hand side represents the expected second
period gain from under{investment: if the state of the world is low (which happens with prob-
ability 1   q), the utilitarian incumbent will obtain his most preferred level of migration in the
second period. Since by playing sincere he could obtain the same gain with the lower probability
(1  q)(1  ), the expected gain is given by (1  q)2U(under).
As shown by Facchini and Testa (2014), the equilibrium of the game when the incumbent is
utilitarian can be characterized as follows:13
Proposition 1 Let eu =   (1 q)1HU(under)+q1LU(under)(1 q)2U(under) > 0. If q > 12 and  > eu, there exists
a pooling equilibrium with under{investment whereby, if s = L, the utilitarian incumbent admits
Ip(H) migrants and is re-elected, whereas if s = H, I
u
b (H) migrants are admitted and he is voted
out of oce. If q > 1
2
and  < eu, there exists instead a separating equilibrium such that Ib(L)
migrants are admitted if s = L, Ib(H) are admitted if s = H, and the utilitarian incumbent is
never re-elected. Finally, if q  1
2
the utilitarian incumbent plays sincere and is not re-elected.
The rst part of the proposition points out that electoral incentives can induce the utilitarian
politician to admit on purpose more migrants than the number specied under his ocial target,
by strategically under-investing in enforcement. Moreover, Facchini and Testa (2014) show that re-
election concerns raise illegal immigration above the level implied purely by imperfect information
on the true supply of foreign workers.
3 Border vs domestic enforcement
Having analyzed the main forces inducing a utilitarian politician to adopt a strategic behavior
when a single enforcement technology is available, we now extend the model developed by Facchini
and Testa (2014) to allow the choice between two dierent instruments. In particular, we are
interested in analyzing whether an enforcement technology that is less cost{eective might be
13In the case of a populist incumbent, in equilibrium he always chooses the policy preferred by the median voter
and is re-elected, because in a separating equilibrium voters can perfectly infer his type, whereas in a pooling
equilibrium the number of illegal immigrants generated by the populist never exceeds the threshold required for
re-election. See Facchini and Testa (2014) for the proof of these results.
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chosen in equilibrium. To x ideas, the rst technology { which we call domestic enforcement {
can be thought of as coinciding with the type of enforcement activity we have analyzed so far.
The second one requires instead more resources to enforce any given migration target under both
states of the world. In the policy debate, the control of migration ows carried out at the border
is often considered to be less eective than work-site inspections, because eectively patrolling a
vast border with its huge number of potential entry points is more costly than eectively checking
the working sites where undocumented immigrants are likely to be employed (Hanson 2006).14
Hence, we will call our second instrument border enforcement. Naturally, our analysis applies also
to any other form of inecient use of enforcement resources.
Formally, let B(I^ ; I) and D(I^ ; I) respectively denote the border (B) and domestic (D) en-
forcement technology, and let
B(I^ ; I) > D(I^ ; I)8I^ 2 fI; Ig (7)
To simplify the discussion, we make one additional assumption, i.e. that B(I; I) = D(I; I). In
other words, enforcing a given migration target in the low state of the world using the border
enforcement technology is as costly as enforcing the same target using the domestic enforcement
technology if the state of the world is high. The two instruments are represented in Figure 2.
Moving from the left to the right, the rst line (D(I)) describes the cost of domestic enforcement
under the low state of the world. The second line (D(I) = B(I)) captures both the cost of
domestic enforcement if the state of the world is high, and the cost of border enforcement if the
state is low. The last line (B(I)) displays instead the border enforcement cost under the high
state of the world.
As in our previous discussion, at the beginning of the game, neither the politician nor the
public observe the supply of immigrants I^(s), but they know its distribution. At the end of the
rst mandate, voters observe the number of immigrants in the country, but not the amount of
resources spent on enforcement nor how the resources have been employed (i.e. on the more or
less eective technology). As a consequence, the government can strategically set not only the
budget allocated to the enforcement activities, but also decide how the resources are employed. In
particular, a utilitarian government can admit the same number of migrants allowed by a populist
when the state of the world is high in two alternative ways. First, as before, he can strategically
under{invest, spending U and obtaining a migration level I
u
b (L) = Ip(H) and I
u
b (H) respectively
14Border enforcement may also be less eective because it only aects the migrant at the time of the illegal border
crossing, whereas domestic enforcement implies that the migrant may be apprehended at any point in time after
he has entered illegally, and after he has faced destination country{specic sunk costs. Hence, a lower probability
of domestic enforcement could generate the same reduction in expected gains from illegal immigration induced by
any given probability of being caught at the border. Finally, if domestic enforcement takes the form of worksite
inspections, levying nes on employers this will make the policy (fully or partially) self-nancing, dierently from
border enforcement. We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting these arguments.
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Figure 2: Illegal immigration with domestic and border enforcement
if the state of the world is low and high (see Figure 2). Alternatively, the benevolent politician
can spend the amount of resources that would maximize the median voter's welfare (Ep() > U),
but employ them \ineectively" by adopting border instead of domestic enforcement. Also in this
case, if the state of the world is low the number of migrants admitted would be the same chosen
by a populist under the high state (Ip(H)), implying that the utilitarian politician might have a
chance to be re-elected. On the other hand, if the state is high, the resulting number of migrants
would be IBb (H) (see Figure 2).
Given the new strategy space, the updating process of the median voter's beliefs becomes
richer. Let D and B denote the probability that a utilitarian incumbent generates the outcome
I by choosing respectively domestic (D) and border (B) enforcement. As before, L denotes the
probability that a utilitarian incumbent generates an outcome I when the state of the world is
low, and H the probability that he generates the same outcome if the state is high. Then, if
voters observe the outcome Ip(H), the ex-post probability that the incumbent is a populist can
be computed as follows:
P [g = pjIp(H)] = q
q + q(1  )H + [(D + B)(1  q)(1  )]L
where q is the probability that Ip(H) is generated by a populist, q(1 )H is the probability
that it is generated by a utilitarian politician mimicking the populist, and (1  q)(1  )L is the
probability that it is generated by a utilitarian politician, either by under-investing in enforcement
(D) or by choosing the ineective enforcement technology (B).
As in the case with a single enforcement tool, mimicking cannot be optimal since it does not
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generate any positive updating in beliefs. On the other hand, whenever q > 1=2, the adoption
of under{investment in domestic enforcement or border enforcement generate the same positive
update of beliefs. The next proposition characterizes the optimal choice of a utilitarian politician
if q > 1=2 and both domestic and border enforcement are available. Let uj[I(s)] = ~u[I(s)]  
j[I(s); I], with j = B;D, where ~u[I(s)] = (E)+w(E)  c(I) is the component of the utilitarian
politician's utility function, that does not depend on the enforcement expenditure. Following the
notation we have introduced in section 2, let 1HU(border) = u[I
B
b (H)]   u[Ib(H)] < 0 be the
rst period utility dierence from choosing border enforcement over the sincere policy when the
state of the world is high, and 1LU(border) = u[Ip(H)]  u[IBb (L)] < 0 be the rst period utility
dierence when the state is low. 2U(border) = u[Ib (L)]   u[Ip (L)] > 0 denotes instead the
second period utility gain from being in power when the state of the world is low. Finally, let us
dene eB =   q1HU(border)+(1 q)1LU(border)(1 q)2U(border) > 0. The following then holds:
Proposition 2 Let q > 1=2 and suppose that  > eu. Then, if ~u[IBb (H)]   ~u[Iub (H)] < 0, the
utilitarian politician chooses under{investment in domestic enforcement. If ~u[IBb (H)] ~u[Iub (H)] >
0, then the utilitarian politician chooses border enforcement if and only if qf~u[IBb (H)] ~u[Iub (H)]g 
Ep()  U . On the other hand, if  < eu, the utilitarian politician chooses border enforcement ifeB <  < eu, whereas he implements the sincere policy if  < eu < eB or  < eB < eu.
Proof. Note that if  > e, from the proof of Proposition 1 in Facchini and Testa (2014) we know
that under{investment with domestic enforcement is preferred to the sincere policy. Hence, border
enforcement is chosen over domestic enforcement if the resulting expected payo is larger. This is
true if and only if
qf~u[IBb (H)]  ~u[Iub (H)]g  Ep()  U (8)
Remember that Ep()   U > 0. Hence, if ~u[IBb (H)]   ~u[Iub (H)] < 0, then inequality 8 is never
satised, whereas if ~u[IBb (H)]  ~u[Iub (H)] > 0, inequality 8 is satised if and only if qf~u[IBb (H)] 
~u[Iub (H)]g  Ep() U . The proof of Proposition 1 in Facchini and Testa (2014) tells us also that
if  < eu, the sincere policy is preferred to domestic enforcement. Hence, border enforcement is
chosen over the sincere policy if the resulting payo is larger, i.e. if and only if
(1  q)2U(border) >  q1HU(border)  (1  q)1LU(border) (9)
and this is true if and only if  > eB.
The intuition for the result is as follows. In our two-period setting, the incumbent chooses the
rst period policy by maximizing his expected pay-o that depends on the state of the world (which
is not observed either by the policy maker or the public) and on the extent of populist pressures
(). The rst part of the proposition characterizes the equilibrium policy choice when  > eu. In
order to understand how the expected payo of the utilitarian politician depends on the state of
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the world, note that when the state of the world is low, domestic enforcement is more desirable
because it delivers the same number of migrants as border enforcement using less resources. On
the other hand, if the state of the world is high, under-investment and border enforcement do not
deliver the same number of migrants, because the latter, while employing more resources, generates
less migrants, as shown in Figure 2. The desirability of one instrument over the other crucially
depends on the preferences of the utilitarian politician on the optimal number of migrants to be
admitted, Ib . In particular, if I

b < I
B
b (H), then border enforcement is less distortive because the
expected number of migrants it generates is closer to the utilitarian ideal point Ib as compared
to domestic enforcement with under-investment. On the other hand, if Ib > I
B
b (H), then border
can be more or less distortive than domestic enforcement, depending on whether it generates a
number of migrants that is further away from or closer to the utilitarian's ideal point as compared
to the other technology. Note that, if border is more distortive (e.g. ~u[IBb (H)]   ~u[Iub (H)] < 0),
then it is clearly dominated by domestic under-investment as the latter is also less costly. On the
other hand, if border is less distortive (e.g ~u[IBb (H)]  ~u[Iub (H)] > 0), then it dominates domestic
under-investment provided that the utility gain in terms of number of migrants outweighs the
larger cost of enforcement (e.g. qf~u[IBb (H)]   ~u[Iub (H)]g  Ep()   U). The second part of the
proposition (i.e. when  < eu) shows that, even if the sincere policy is preferred to domestic
enforcement, border enforcement might still be chosen in equilibrium. In other words, allowing for
an additional instrument besides under{investment enables the utilitarian politician to sustain a
pooling equilibrium in which he can generate \excessive" illegal immigration that could have not
been achieved if only under{investment was available.
In our analysis so far, voters are uninformed both concerning the amount of resources spent
and on the eectiveness of the enforcement technology. After September 11, 2001 migration
policy in the US has come under increased scrutiny, and much attention has been focused on the
activities of the newly established Department of Homeland Security. While policy-makers still
retain a substantial information advantage because the publicly available data on the enforcement
budget are typically not very detailed, the public might have become more informed on the total
amount of resources spent on enforcement as compared to the eectiveness of dierent enforcement
technologies. How will our results be aected by this change in the information setting? To
characterize this asymmetry in the simplest way, let us assume that the public can observe only
the amount of resources spent on enforcement. When the enforcement budget is known, the under{
investment strategy allows the public to perfectly infer the politician's type. As a consequence,
an equilibrium with under{investment in domestic enforcement cannot arise. On the other hand,
ineciently high illegal immigration can still occur as a result of an ineective use of the resources
spent on enforcement. In particular, we can show that the following holds:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the median voter observes the amount of resources spent on enforce-
ment. Then the utilitarian politician chooses border enforcement if  > eB, whereas he chooses
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the sincere policy if  < eB.
Proof. Since the sincere strategy is always preferred to domestic enforcement, then border en-
forcement is chosen if and only if it delivers a higher payo than the sincere strategy and this is
true if and only if if  > eB.
Note that, when more information on enforcement spending becomes available to the public,
domestic enforcement with under{investment can no longer be used by the utilitarian politician
to \pool" with the populist. As a result, the former will resort more often to the adoption of the
sincere policy to admit the constrained socially optimal number of migrants in the rst period,
losing elections. He will then be replaced by a challenger, which is populist with probability  and
utilitarian with probability 1   . Therefore, in a sincere equilibrium the utilitarian incumbent
does not distort his rst period policy choice, but is less likely to win election and choose the
social surplus maximizing policy in the second period. To understand how information revelation
aects the welfare of the average voter, consider a benchmark case where the public is perfectly
informed about enforcement. In this scenario, since the utilitarian politician always plays sincere,
the average voter obtains his most preferred policy in the rst period, whereas in the second
period his most preferred policy is chosen with probability 1   and the policy preferred by the
median voter is implemented with probability . On the other hand, when the public cannot
observe enforcement, the utilitarian politician may decide to distort his rst period policy choice
in order to increase his re-election chances. In this case the average voter scores worse in terms
of `discipline', as the rst period policy is distorted, but fairs better in terms of `selection', since
the utilitarian incumbent is more likely to be re-elected. Since the utilitarian policy-maker acts
by maximizing expected average welfare, he only distorts the rst period policy if the `selection'
gain is larger than the rst period distortion. As a result, although distortive, the policy chosen in
the asymmetric information scenario is in fact welfare enhancing because it allows the utilitarian
politician to be re-elected with higher probability bringing the overall number of migrants closer to
the social optimum. If instead of the average voter we consider the well-being of the majority, the
results are reversed, because asymmetric information makes the discipline and selection problems
harder for the median voter.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model to study how governments choose migration policy
enforcement when they can use alternative tools characterized by dierent degrees of cost eec-
tiveness. We have shown that electoral concerns may induce a policy maker to choose sub-optimal
enforcement, which leads to \excessively high" illegal immigration. We have considered two sources
of policy ineciency. On the one hand, the government might strategically under{fund migration
control operations; on the other, it might respond to public pressure for adequate funding, but
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strategically use the resources in an ineective way. We have shown that, as long as the policy
maker has an information advantage over the public concerning the way it controls migration ows,
it might nd it optimal to announce a target pleasing a majority of the electorate, but then strate-
gically relax its enforcement, by either under{investing or using resources ineectively. Our results
provide a rationale not only for the disproportionate amount of resources devoted to ineective
enforcement tools { such as border control { at the expense of arguably more eective ones { such
domestic work-site inspections { but also highlights the factors that induce an elected government
to choose one policy tool over the other. The size of the supply of migrants is key to determine the
choice of instrument. In particular, when the supply of foreign workers is large, border enforcement
might be preferred because, although more costly, it could bring the number of migrants closer to
the utilitarian optimum, thus reducing the policy distortion driven by strategic motives. These
results have important policy implications. First, they indicate that electoral considerations are
responsible for wasteful spending on enforcement because, in an attempt to bring migration closer
to his most preferred outcome while avoiding electoral punishment, a utilitarian politician spends
an excessive amount of resources on a ineective policy tool. Second, since border control may be
desirable only when the supply of potential migrants is large, countries that are more exposed to
large migratory pressures, might also be more likely to resort to inecient enforcement tools. As
a result, we cannot escape the somewhat troublesome conclusion that enforcement is carried out
in the least eective way when migration is a most pressing problem.
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Table1. Border patrol and worksite inspections
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
INS/ICE apprehensions 135406 137940 120669 107262 115060 123267
Border Patrol apprehensions 1578594 1677060 1266331 954738 930940 1281533
Worksite inspection hours 480000 352000 234000 264000 180000 302000
Line-watch border patrol hours 8740258 8999552 9802081 9183667 9457060 9236524
Worksite inspection hours per apprehension 3.5 2.6 1.9 2.5 1.6 2.4
Line-watch border patrol hours per apprehension 5.5 5.4 7.7 9.6 10.2 7.7
Source: Hanson (2006) and GAO (2005)
